From Beirut to Bogotá: The Reach of Middle Eastern Terrorism in South America

Key Insights

This article presents an investigation into the expanding presence and operational footprint of Middle Eastern terrorist groups—primarily Hezbollah, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and to a lesser extent Hamas—across Latin America. It traces the evolution of their involvement from early fundraising and smuggling activities in the Tri-Border Area (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay) to more recent plots involving surveillance of Jewish targets, assassination attempts, and covert logistics operations. Hezbollah’s integration into regional criminal economies, particularly through drug trafficking and money laundering, has become a critical source of funding, especially as Iranian state support wanes. Venezuela emerges as a key enabler, providing political cover, infrastructure, and ideological alignment with Iran, while other hotspots include Peru, Colombia, Chile, and Bolivia. The article also highlights a surge in recent enforcement actions—such as arrests, designations, and sanctions—alongside continued challenges: uneven counterterrorism policies, limited intelligence-sharing, political reluctance, and outdated threat assessments. It concludes with a call for coordinated action among the U.S., Latin American states, and international institutions to counter these networks before they enable destabilizing violence or global attacks.

Introduction

Latin America, once seen as a remote and stable region, has in recent years become a focus of concern for counterterrorism experts due to the growing presence of Middle Eastern militant networks. Long overlooked as a base for actors like Hezbollah, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and Hamas, South America is increasingly tied to their financial and operational activities. In late 2023, Brazilian authorities, assisted by Israeli intelligence, disrupted a Hezbollah-affiliated cell planning attacks on Jewish targets in São Paulo. Incidents like this highlight the region’s vulnerabilities, particularly in areas such as the Tri-Border Area (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay) and Venezuela, where weak border controls and institutional fragility provide fertile ground for illicit networks.

This threat is not new. The 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy and the 1994 AMIA Jewish center bombing in Buenos Aires, which together killed over 100 people, remain among the worst terrorist attacks in the Western Hemisphere. Argentine investigators later linked both attacks to Iran and Hezbollah. Hezbollah has operated in Latin America since the 1980s, establishing networks in over a dozen countries and embedding itself in business and criminal enterprises to finance its global operations. With Lebanon and Syria weakened by conflict, analysts warn that Hezbollah may increasingly rely on its Latin American infrastructure for funding and strategic depth.

Iran’s influence extends beyond Hezbollah. The IRGC, particularly its Quds Force, has cultivated a strong presence in South America, with Venezuela serving as a key ally. Under Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro, Caracas has provided cover for Iranian operatives, including issuing visas, hosting IRGC personnel, and facilitating flights suspected of transporting weapons or agents. In 2024, a RAND report confirmed the presence of IRGC officials, including a former Quds commander, aboard a Venezuelan aircraft in Argentina. The Iran-Venezuela alliance, formalized in a 20-year strategic partnership in 2022, encompasses cooperation in oil, drone production, and mining. Within this arrangement, Hezbollah operatives reportedly enjoy access to state infrastructure, enabling money laundering and arms transfers under government protection.

Hamas also has a limited footprint in the region. In 2024, Argentina designated Hamas a terrorist organization and froze its assets, citing its ties to Iran and its role in the October 7, 2023 attack on Israel. While Hamas lacks an extensive operational presence in South America, it is believed to benefit from local fundraising networks embedded within religious and community organizations, a tactic long used by Hezbollah. Argentina’s move reflects growing regional scrutiny of groups aligned with Iran and signals that even indirect support may now trigger legal consequences.

Legacy of Terror: Past Attacks and Early Footprints

Latin America's experience with Middle Eastern terrorism dates back more than three decades. Two major attacks in Argentina drew global attention: the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires and the 1994 truck bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center, which killed 85 people. At the time, these were the deadliest terrorist attacks in the Western Hemisphere. Argentine investigators later attributed both incidents to Hezbollah, with Iran identified as the orchestrator through its proxy network.

These attacks marked the beginning of Hezbollah’s long-term presence in South America. The group is believed to have established a foothold in the mid-1980s, particularly in the Tri-Border Area (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay), taking advantage of weak border enforcement and sizable Lebanese and Shiite communities. According to Argentine investigations, Hezbollah used this base in Ciudad del Este, Paraguay, to operate illicit businesses, including counterfeit goods, cigarette smuggling, and money laundering, to finance its global activities. Over time, it became embedded in the region’s criminal underworld.

By the 2000s, several South American countries began formally recognizing Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, including Argentina, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, and Paraguay. Brazil remains a notable exception. Still, for years, official attention to the group’s presence was limited. Public reports were outdated, and U.S. congressional oversight on Iran’s influence in the region had been dormant since 2015. Intelligence assessments warning of Hezbollah’s activities in the hemisphere, such as a 2010 State Department report, received little public traction.

Despite limited scrutiny, Hezbollah maintained and expanded its operations. Rather than drawing attention through ideology, it quietly developed a network of front companies, mosques, and charitable organizations aimed at recruiting from the local diaspora. Its reach extended beyond the Tri-Border Area to include operations in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and elsewhere. A 2025 analysis described Hezbollah as an opportunistic and covert actor exploiting fragile institutions across the region. Today, experts warn that, amid ongoing local instability and global distractions, Latin America could again serve as a staging ground for militant networks, less as a battlefield, and more as a financial and logistical base hidden in plain sight.

Hezbollah and Iran’s Expansion

While Hezbollah's Latin American networks have long focused on financing, evolving geopolitical dynamics are reshaping their role. According to RAND analyst Marzia Giambertoni, the escalation of conflict between Israel and Hamas in October 2023, coupled with leadership losses in Iran, has disrupted Hezbollah’s global strategy. The group may increasingly view the Americas as a strategic fallback, leveraging regional financial flows to compensate for wartime losses and using clandestine cells as potential operational outposts. In November 2023, Brazilian authorities disrupted a Hezbollah-linked cell accused of plotting attacks on Jewish sites. A year later, Argentina identified Lebanese national Hussein Ahmad Karaki, previously implicated in the 1990s Buenos Aires bombings, as the head of Hezbollah’s external operations across Latin America. Analysts see his continued activity as evidence that the region remains a strategic priority for the group.

Hezbollah’s approach combines ideological commitment with practical needs. While its core objective remains opposition to Israel and the West, securing financial resources and operational flexibility is equally important. With Iranian funding increasingly constrained by sanctions, historically comprising around 70% of its budget, Hezbollah has turned to illicit activities. By partnering with drug cartels, arms traffickers, and transnational criminal groups across Latin America, the organization raises millions through money laundering, narcotics, and cybercrime. The U.S. disruption of the Ayman Joumaa network, which laundered hundreds of millions in cocaine proceeds through American car dealerships, exemplifies this model. Hezbollah’s alliances span Mexican cartels, regional gangs, and even insurgent movements—providing funding, cover, and logistical support.

Parallel to Hezbollah’s expansion, Iran’s Quds Force, has established a covert presence in Latin America. The IRGC, designated as a terrorist organization by the U.S., operates through proxy networks to project Iranian influence abroad. In 2021, U.S. authorities charged four IRGC operatives with plotting to kidnap an Iranian dissident using Venezuelan territory as an exfiltration route. Subsequent reports from Argentina tied Iran-backed cells to attempted assassinations of Israeli and U.S. targets in Colombia between 2021 and 2024, one of which was reportedly planned in retaliation for the killing of Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani.

Iran’s military influence in the region has also grown through its partnership with Venezuela. Under Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela has permitted the IRGC to build drone production facilities, purchase military equipment, and operate on Venezuelan soil. Analysts warn that this cooperation effectively turns Venezuela into a regional arms hub for Iran, with the potential to destabilize neighboring countries and key maritime corridors. Through its alliance with Hezbollah and the IRGC, Iran is establishing a long-term footprint in South America, not through overt military deployments, but via financial infiltration, covert logistics, and state-supported industrial expansion.

Hamas and Other Proxies

Compared to Hezbollah, Hamas has a limited presence in Latin America. While it holds some support among Palestinian and Islamist communities, it lacks the extensive networks Hezbollah has built through the Lebanese diaspora. Nonetheless, regional governments have taken notice, particularly after Hamas’s October 2023 attacks on Israel. In July 2024, Argentina became the first country in the region to officially designate Hamas a terrorist organization, citing its connection to Iran and recent acts of violence. The government froze Hamas-related assets and committed to pursuing its fundraising networks. Although most other Latin American nations have not followed suit, concerns persist, especially within Jewish communities, about the potential for Hamas-linked individuals to operate discreetly under the guise of charitable or cultural organizations.

There are signs that Hamas has accessed financial support from the region. U.S. Treasury reports indicate the group has long exploited sham charities worldwide to raise funds. In 2024, U.S. authorities imposed new sanctions on Hamas financiers, warning that anonymous donations from regions like Europe and possibly Latin America continue to fuel its operations. Pro-Palestinian rallies, particularly in countries like Chile and Argentina, have occasionally included appeals for financial support, raising the risk of unmonitored fundraising. While no major Hamas plots have surfaced in the region recently, officials remain vigilant, viewing any Iranian-backed proxy as a potential security concern.

Beyond Hamas and Hezbollah, other Iran-aligned actors operate more discreetly. The sizable Lebanese Shiite diaspora in Venezuela and Brazil includes individuals sympathetic to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. At the same time, Iran’s Quds Force has established connections with regional extremist elements, reportedly providing training and support to Colombia’s ELN rebels and cultivating relationships with anti-Western movements in Peru and Bolivia. Collectively, these actors form a diffuse but persistent network across Latin America, blending ideological alignment with illicit activity and leveraging weak state institutions to operate below the radar.

Money, Drugs, and Smuggling: Financing Terror

Middle Eastern groups operating in South America are deeply involved in criminal enterprises, primarily to generate revenue. Hezbollah, in particular, has established an extensive financial network encompassing pharmacies, import-export businesses, car dealerships, currency exchanges, and narcotics trafficking. With direct funding from Iran increasingly limited, these illicit activities serve as a critical source of income.

Several high-profile cases highlight this nexus. In the late 2000s, Lebanese-Colombian businessman Ayman Joumaa managed a vast money-laundering operation, funneling proceeds from Colombian cocaine sales to Hezbollah in Lebanon. U.S. authorities dismantled the network in 2010, estimating that it had laundered hundreds of millions of dollars. Other Hezbollah-linked financiers include currency exchangers and smugglers in Brazil and Paraguay, many of whom have faced prosecution or deportation. One example involved Lebanese-Paraguayan trafficker Ali Issa Chamas, who coordinated cocaine shipments from Bolivia through Paraguay in collaboration with Colombian and U.S. contacts.

Hezbollah has since evolved its financial operations to avoid detection, increasingly working through local criminal organizations. Instead of relying solely on diaspora cells, the group now recruits former criminals as enforcers or couriers to obscure its role. Its network extends across Peru’s mining areas, Colombia’s urban centers, Bolivia’s coca-producing zones, and Chile’s ports, facilitating the movement of narcotics, counterfeit goods, and other contraband, with a portion of the profits funneled back to the Middle East. Authorities have also flagged suspicious financial activities, such as large cash deposits and real estate acquisitions by Lebanese-Venezuelan nationals, as potential indicators of Hezbollah-linked money laundering.

Iran has similarly exploited Latin America’s illicit markets. Investigations have uncovered Iranian operatives mining gold in Venezuela’s Orinoco region, with profits benefiting both the Maduro regime and, indirectly, Hezbollah. Tehran has also used regional intermediaries to smuggle oil and gasoline into sanctioned markets. Venezuela’s largely unregulated and corruption-prone economy offers ideal conditions for these transactions.

Taken together, these activities have turned parts of South America into a key hub for terror financing, where transnational crime intersects with geopolitical agendas. Hezbollah’s focus in the region increasingly centers on embedding within criminal networks, laundering illicit proceeds, and sustaining a global financial lifeline under the radar of law enforcement.

The Tri-Border Area: A Gateway of Secrecy

Geography plays a critical role in the operations of Middle Eastern militant groups in Latin America. Two areas in particular have emerged as key hubs:

Tri-Border Area (TBA)

The region where Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay meet is one of the most unregulated zones in the Western Hemisphere. Known for black markets and informal banking, it also hosts the largest Lebanese and Syrian diaspora in Latin America. Analysts have long identified the TBA as a center of Iranian and Hezbollah activity. Cities like Ciudad del Este, Foz do Iguaçu, and Puerto Iguazú contain Hezbollah-linked mosques, Islamic centers, and charities. Since the 1980s, the area has been used to generate funding for Hezbollah, and was reportedly involved in the logistics of the 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires. In response, South American governments partnered with the U.S. to form the 3+1 Group (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and the U.S.) after 9/11 to enhance intelligence sharing and security operations. While some progress has been made, including arrests of Hezbollah-linked money launderers, significant challenges persist. Criminal enterprises often overlap, and individuals involved in arms or drug smuggling may also serve as Hezbollah operatives. The TBA remains a nexus of transnational crime and militant finance.

Venezuela:

Under the leadership of Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela has become a key ally of Iran and a permissive environment for Iranian proxies. The government has reportedly issued passports to Iranian operatives and used state-run airline Conviasa to transport Quds Force personnel. Venezuela provides a level of protection, logistical support, and operational freedom to Iran and Hezbollah unmatched by any other country in the region. This partnership was formalized through a 20-year strategic agreement signed in 2022, covering cooperation in military affairs, media, education, and resource extraction. Venezuelan schools have incorporated Iranian ideological content, and Iranian-backed media outlets broadcast propaganda in Spanish. Meanwhile, Venezuela’s gold mines have become a financial resource for Iran, indirectly benefiting Hezbollah’s network. Hezbollah operatives are believed to work within Venezuelan intelligence and security structures, facilitating money laundering and covert activity with state backing. In effect, Venezuela functions as Iran’s principal operational base in the Western Hemisphere. A 2025 U.S. Senate report described the Maduro regime as enabling Iranian expansion in Latin America. With direct access to regional air and sea routes, operatives can move across borders into Colombia, Ecuador, or the Caribbean with minimal detection. Colombian officials have linked Iran to recent assassination attempts on their soil, and U.S. agencies have expressed concern over terrorist use of unofficial Venezuelan “ghost flights.”

Other hotspots include:

· Colombia, where towns like Maicao, Bogotá, and Cali have seen suspicious financial activity linked to Middle Eastern actors.

· Northern Chile, particularly the ports of Iquique and Arica, which have been flagged for attempted Hezbollah-linked shipments.

· Bolivia, where weak governance and expansive coca fields present opportunities for Hezbollah to engage in drug trafficking, a tactic reportedly employed by individuals like Ali Chamas.

In sum, areas with porous borders, limited regulatory oversight, or access to illicit economies have become entry points for Iranian proxies across the region, allowing them to quietly expand their influence and financial operations.

Recent Alarms: Plots and Busts in 2024–25

Over the past year, previously latent threats tied to Middle Eastern militant groups in Latin America have materialized into active operations:

· Brazil, November 2023 (Operation Trapiche): Brazilian federal police arrested two individuals linked to Hezbollah who had allegedly scouted synagogues and the Israeli Embassy in São Paulo for potential attacks. The suspects reportedly traveled from Beirut, met with Hezbollah operatives, and compiled target lists. The investigation, carried out in coordination with Israeli intelligence, marked the first publicly disclosed disruption of an active Hezbollah-linked plot in Latin America. The arrests heightened concern within Brazil’s Jewish community and triggered regional security alerts.

· Argentina, October 2024 (Hezbollah Commander Identified): Argentina’s security ministry announced that Lebanese national Hussein Ahmad Karaki, long sought for the 1990s Buenos Aires bombings, is now serving as Hezbollah’s regional operations chief. Though based in Lebanon, Karaki is believed to have coordinated the thwarted plots in Brazil and to have enlisted criminal elements in Peru and Colombia for targeted killings. Authorities also linked him to a 2017 plan to bomb a building in La Paz, Bolivia, on a scale comparable to the AMIA attack. His continued involvement underscores Hezbollah’s persistent presence and strategic interest in the region.

· Argentina, June 2022 (Mahan Air Incident): Argentine officials grounded a Venezuelan cargo plane previously owned by Iran’s Mahan Air and discovered Iranian crew members with suspected IRGC and Quds Force ties. Authorities suspected the flight was part of an effort to bypass international sanctions and possibly transport weapons or operatives. This incident mirrored earlier revelations involving a foiled plot to kidnap an Iranian dissident via Venezuela, further highlighting covert Iranian activity in the region.

· Peru, March 2024 (Azizi Arrest): Peruvian police apprehended Iranian national Rahmatullah Asadi Azizi, accused of recruiting local ex-convicts to carry out an attack on an Israeli businessman in Lima. Peru has previously declined extradition requests for Middle Eastern suspects, raising concerns that its government may not be adequately addressing the threat. Nonetheless, the arrest reflects the spread of Iran-linked operational cells into Peru.

· Colombia, 2021–2024 (Assassination Plots): Colombian authorities have uncovered multiple assassination attempts involving Iranian networks. In one case, a plot to kill two Israeli businessmen in Bogotá was reportedly ordered in retaliation for the killing of Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani. A separate plot targeted a former Israeli diplomat and involved recruiting local gang members. Officials have since warned of sleeper cells in the country capable of launching attacks on command.

· Regional Sanctions and Intelligence Actions, 2023–2025: U.S. agencies have intensified efforts to disrupt terror financing. In late 2023, the Treasury Department sanctioned dozens of Hezbollah financiers across South America, including individuals tied to the AMIA bombing. Under “Project Cassandra,” the FBI and DEA have continued targeting Hezbollah’s drug and money laundering networks. Financial institutions in Panama and Bolivia have been cautioned about processing Hezbollah-linked transactions. In May 2025, a U.S. court indicted two alleged Hezbollah couriers involved in an arms-smuggling scheme to Syria, illustrating the global scope of the network, even if not directly linked to Latin America. Despite these actions, many suspects remain at large, prompting calls for improved intelligence sharing and regional cooperation.

These developments reflect a shifting security landscape. Plots once considered improbable are now treated as credible threats. U.S. and allied intelligence agencies increasingly warn that a future terrorist attack on American or Israeli targets could be traced back to logistical and financial support networks rooted in Latin America. The risk is no longer theoretical, operational ties between militant groups and regional criminal networks are now a matter of global concern.

Geopolitical Ripples

The implications of Middle Eastern militant activity in South America extend far beyond the region, impacting both U.S. homeland security and broader international relations.

For the United States, the stability of Latin America and the security of its borders are directly linked. Hezbollah’s connections to Mexican drug cartels and Central American gangs offer potential new pathways for smuggling operations into U.S. territory. Analysts warn that these networks are capable of exploiting existing cross-border vulnerabilities to reach American cities. U.S. border agents have detained migrants carrying forged Syrian or Iranian passports, raising concerns about the possible infiltration of extremist elements. With hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans crossing into the U.S. in recent years, most fleeing economic hardship, security experts caution that a small number could serve as facilitators or operatives for hostile groups. In this context, Latin America is increasingly viewed as a gateway through which global terrorism could access the United States.

For Israel, Latin America represents both a geopolitical ally and a potential security risk. The Jewish populations of Argentina and Brazil are among the largest outside of Israel, and both countries have historically maintained strong ties with the Israeli government. However, tensions over Middle East conflicts, especially Gaza, have fueled domestic protests and anti-Israel sentiment. A terrorist attack on Jewish targets in the region would carry significant human and diplomatic consequences. Israeli intelligence agencies continue to monitor regional developments closely; for example, Mossad maintains longstanding files on the 1990s Buenos Aires bombings. Under President Javier Milei, Argentina has strengthened its alignment with Israel, formally condemning Hezbollah and Hamas. This shift highlights the extent to which counterterrorism policy is intertwined with Israel’s global diplomacy. Meanwhile, countries such as Chile, Mexico, and Brazil—once more neutral—now face increasing pressure to address extremist activity within their borders or risk becoming permissive environments for it.

For Latin American countries themselves, the stakes are immediate. States that tolerate or support designated terrorist organizations risk international isolation. Analysts argue that Venezuela’s overt collaboration with Iran and Hezbollah effectively positions it as a state sponsor of terrorism. This has prompted calls from U.S. lawmakers to reclassify Venezuela under terrorism sanctions legislation. Even in the absence of formal designations, these alliances influence regional dynamics. For example, anti-interventionist sentiment in Bolivia and Peru may be partially driven by economic dependence on Iranian energy or Chinese investment, which often comes with political expectations. In Mexico, officials have been criticized for prioritizing economic partnerships over confronting security threats posed by foreign terrorist networks.

Public awareness across Latin America is also increasing. In Argentina, revelations of a disrupted Hezbollah plot in 2023 sparked widespread concern, especially among the Jewish community, and prompted calls for stronger counterterrorism measures. In Brazil, the 2022 arrest of a Saudi national accused of financing Hezbollah operations underscored the possibility that even religious travelers could pose risks. And in Paraguay, the president, himself of Lebanese descent, committed to increasing patrols in the Tri-Border Area following FBI warnings.

The message is clear: Middle Eastern militant networks are no longer a remote threat. Their growing entanglement with Latin American criminal networks and political institutions underscores the urgency of regional and international action.

Policy Responses and Continuing Gaps

Governments across the Americas have begun responding to the growing presence of Middle Eastern militant networks, but many analysts argue that a significant gap remains between stated commitments and practical enforcement.

Designations:

Argentina, along with four other Latin American countries, has designated Hezbollah a terrorist organization; Argentina also added Hamas to its list in 2024. The U.S. and EU have long classified both groups as terrorist entities. However, several key nations—including Brazil and Uruguay—have yet to take similar steps. A 2025 U.S. Senate report highlighted that only five Latin American countries have officially banned Hezbollah, leaving legal and jurisdictional gaps that these groups can exploit.

International Cooperation:

Since the post-9/11 creation of the “3+1” group (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and the U.S.), cross-border collaboration has improved. Joint operations have led to raids and extraditions targeting Hezbollah-linked traffickers. In 2023, the Global Counterterrorism Forum held its first regional meeting focused on Middle Eastern threats. The Organization of American States (OAS) has also supported awareness efforts, including outreach to Jewish and civil society groups. Intelligence support from Israel and U.S. financial tracking through FinCEN and Treasury sanctions, such as the 2024 targeting of a Hamas-linked charity, have further bolstered multilateral efforts.

Law Enforcement:

Multinational cooperation has led to significant arrests. In 2023, U.S., European, and Latin agencies sanctioned Hezbollah operative Amer Rada for his role in the AMIA bombing. Paraguay extradited Ali Chamas for drug trafficking linked to Hezbollah. Colombian police disrupted weapons caches and plots against U.S. and Israeli targets, while Peru arrested individuals tied to Iranian assassination squads. These actions show the region's growing capacity to identify and respond to threats.

Resource Limitations:

Despite progress, law enforcement across much of Latin America lacks the funding and training needed for effective counterterrorism operations. Analysts note that regional police forces are often under-resourced and distracted by more immediate priorities such as organized crime, poverty, and political instability. Intelligence efforts are further hampered by outdated public reporting, many unclassified assessments of Hezbollah and Iranian activity in the region are nearly a decade old, limiting legal and prosecutorial capacity.

Legislative Initiatives:

In the U.S., new proposals seek to close policy gaps. The No Hezbollah in Our Hemisphere Act, introduced in March 2025, calls on the State Department to urge Latin American governments to formally ban Hezbollah and adopt stronger enforcement mechanisms. The bill also proposes visa restrictions and other sanctions on officials in countries found to be harboring terrorist operatives. Some lawmakers have renewed calls to officially designate Venezuela as a state sponsor of terrorism, citing growing strategic ties with Iran.

Sanctions and Financial Oversight:

The U.S. has imposed sanctions on dozens of individuals and financial entities in Latin America suspected of funding Hezbollah and Hamas. Treasury actions in late 2024 blacklisted a global Hamas-linked charity network. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has also begun assessing Iran-related risks in Latin America. However, weak local enforcement, particularly in parts of the Caribbean, still allows illicit finance to flow through jurisdictions with minimal charity or money-laundering oversight.

Persistent Challenges:

Experts continue to warn of a gap between high-level policy and operational readiness. Without increased U.S. support, many Latin American law enforcement and intelligence agencies remain ill-equipped to dismantle sophisticated terror networks. Shifting political leadership also threatens continuity in counterterrorism initiatives, particularly when new governments de-emphasize foreign-linked threats. In some cases, governments are reluctant to act. Mexico has not designated Hezbollah or Hamas, and often resists intelligence sharing with the U.S. Brazil has taken a harder stance against Iran’s regional influence but remains inconsistent in its statements on Hezbollah. Meanwhile, countries like Chile and Colombia, which have expressed support for the Palestinian cause, are cautious about taking legal action that could provoke political backlash.

The Information Deficit:

Perhaps the most critical shortfall is the lack of current, unclassified intelligence on Hezbollah and Iranian operations in the region. Analysts emphasize the importance of open-source reporting to fill this void and inform public understanding. Without updated data and sustained pressure, the policy response risks falling behind the pace of evolving threats, leaving governments vulnerable to being caught off guard by future attacks.

Vigilance for the Future

The evidence is mounting: while Latin America faces numerous internal challenges, it cannot afford to overlook the growing reach of Middle Eastern terrorist networks. Hezbollah and Iran have long exploited the region for financing and propaganda. Now, amid shifting geopolitical dynamics, they may increasingly treat it as a viable operational front. The recent wave of plots and arrests signals a clear escalation. As security analysts emphasize, understanding Hezbollah’s activities in Latin America is essential—not optional. Passive optimism will not mitigate the threat.

An effective response requires a multi-faceted approach. The United States and its allies should deepen intelligence sharing with regional partners, expand law enforcement training programs, and apply diplomatic pressure on countries hesitant to adopt stronger counterterrorism designations. Latin American governments must reassess their own threat perceptions and work more closely with neighbors like Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia to restore cross-border coordination. Community-level engagement is also critical; civil society, including Jewish and Arab organizations, should be integrated into counter-radicalization efforts and encouraged to report suspicious activities.

On the financial front, international sanctions and banking regulations must be more rigorously enforced. Financial institutions and trading firms—especially in countries like Panama and Paraguay—should scrutinize transactions involving high-risk clients, particularly those linked to Lebanese or Iranian networks. Authorities must also monitor irregular flight patterns, cross-border travel, and cultural or religious events that could serve as cover for illicit fund transfers and operative movement.

Sustaining momentum on this issue requires political will. Experts argue that counterterrorism in Latin America remains under-analyzed in public discourse. Increased transparency and scrutiny of covert networks are necessary for democratic societies to craft effective safeguards. The persistence of this threat is driven by a combination of impunity for past attacks, the entrenchment of Hezbollah’s infrastructure in areas like the Tri-Border Region, and the group’s ongoing ability to self-finance through criminal enterprises.

In short, Middle Eastern militant networks have established deep and evolving roots in South America, blending ideological extremism with criminal opportunism. Left unaddressed, their activities risk enabling deadly attacks, undermining regional stability, and expanding a transnational threat pipeline from Latin America to the West. As tensions escalate in the Middle East, these networks are unlikely to dissolve on their own. Vigilance—by both policymakers and the public—is essential to contain and counter this growing menace.

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