Khartoum Turns East: How Iran’s Return to Sudan Is Reshaping Red Sea Geopolitics

General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Sudan’s army chief, has shifted the country's foreign policy by forming a new partnership with Iran, disrupting longstanding alliances and raising concerns from Riyadh to Jerusalem. Once aligned with Saudi Arabia and a participant in the Abraham Accords with Israel, Burhan is now relying on Tehran's support as he battles his former deputy, Gen. Mohamed Hamdan "Hemedti" Dagalo and the RSF in a brutal civil war. In 2024, Sudan resumed ties with Iran after an eight-year break, and reports indicate the transfer of Iranian drones and arms to Sudanese forces. This alliance has significant regional implications, potentially internationalizing the Sudanese conflict, destabilizing Red Sea security, and altering the Gulf's balance of power while straining relations with the U.S. and Israel. This article examines the history of Sudan-Iran relations, recent military agreements, and the broader regional impacts of Khartoum’s pivot toward Tehran.

From Allies to Estrangement: A Historical Survey

Sudan's relationship with Iran dates back several decades. Under former President Omar al-Bashir (1989–2019), Sudan became one of Tehran's closest African partners, with Iran providing military and financial aid during the 1990s and 2000s. Iran also stationed IRGC advisors and Quds Force personnel in Sudan, positioning the country as a key member of Iran's "Axis of Resistance." Sudan facilitated arms shipments to Hamas and Hezbollah, drawing condemnation from the U.S. and Israel. In 2009, Israel targeted Iranian arms depots in Sudan to disrupt weapons transfers to Gaza.

This alliance ended in 2016 under pressure from Riyadh and Washington, as Sudan joined the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. Following protests in Iran and attacks on the Saudi embassy, Khartoum severed ties with Tehran and moved toward improving relations with the Gulf monarchies and later Israel. During the 2019–2023 transition, Sudan's military leadership, including Burhan and Hemeti, maintained strong ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, with the Gulf states providing over $3 billion in financial support. Sudan also participated in the fight against Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen until 2016.

Burhan’s Rapprochement with Tehran

The civil war in Sudan, which began in April 2023, has disrupted old alliances, particularly as Burhan's Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) lost support from the UAE following the Saudi-UAE split. Facing defeat by Hemedti’s RSF, Burhan’s forces turned to Iran for support. In mid-2023, after the China-brokered reconciliation between Tehran and Riyadh, Sudan’s generals reversed course, declaring their intent to renew relations with Iran. In July 2023, Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali al-Sadiq met with Iran’s foreign minister in Baku, marking the first high-level contact since 2016. By early 2024, al-Sadiq visited Tehran, meeting President Raisi, which paved the way for the reopening of embassies and the signing of a security cooperation pact in February 2024, although full details remain undisclosed.

Burhan's motivation is pragmatic: his forces, deprived of Gulf and Western support, have suffered significant setbacks. Analysts note that the SAF, in need of military assistance, is particularly interested in Iranian drones, such as the Mohajer-6 and Ababil models, to counter RSF advances. Reports suggest that Burhan’s forces have already deployed these Iranian drones in recent months, and satellite images from January 2024 confirmed their presence at Sudanese airbases. Cargo flights from Iran to Port Sudan have also been tracked, with at least six carrying UAVs, leading to U.S. Treasury sanctions on a Sudanese procurement agent involved in the transaction.

In July 2024, Sudan officially resumed diplomatic ties with Iran after an eight-year hiatus. The Iranian ambassador returned to Khartoum, and Sudan’s foreign minister endorsed the “normal course of action” in re-engaging with Tehran. Both sides have discussed military cooperation, and reports indicate that pro-Iranian militias in eastern Sudan, previously allied with Iran under Bashir, are receiving arms from Tehran again. While there are unconfirmed reports of Iran offering to build a naval base in Port Sudan, such offers have reportedly been declined due to concerns over U.S. and Israeli reactions. Sudan’s rapprochement with Iran extends beyond diplomatic gestures, involving arms shipments and strategic negotiations.

Drones and Arms: The New Arsenal

Drone deliveries are the most tangible evidence of Sudan’s new alliance with Iran. A recent Reuters investigation revealed that U.N.-sanctioned Iranian cargo jets have made multiple trips to Port Sudan, delivering Mohajer and Ababil UAVs to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). These drones began appearing in combat in late 2023, with eyewitnesses in Khartoum reporting a surge in drone strikes and surveillance by January 2024. Despite initial denials from the SAF spokesperson, Sudanese media and RSF intelligence sources confirm that Iranian drones have become a key part of the battlefield. U.S. and Arab analysts also report that Tehran has sent attack drones to Sudan in recent months. The SAF has used Mohajer-6 drones to target RSF positions, forcing retreats in parts of Khartoum and facilitating new army deployments.

Iran and Sudan are also expanding discussions around broader military cooperation. U.S. sanctions filings reveal that Sudan has been acquiring various Iranian weapons, often using front companies to bypass international restrictions. Tehran is leveraging this opportunity to increase its strategic footprint in the region. According to the RAS think tank, the provision of combat UAVs enhances Iran’s diplomatic credibility in Africa and strengthens its position in Eastern Sudan, particularly around the critical port of Port Sudan. Given Sudan’s past role within Iran’s sphere of influence, alongside countries like Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, it could again serve as a platform for covert regional operations. Israeli analysts have expressed alarm, warning that Sudan’s overt alignment with Iran could present new security threats.

In sum, Burhan has found a patron willing to supply the military hardware he needs. While the drones are not decisive on their own, they enhance the SAF’s surveillance and strike capabilities at a critical juncture. Analysts warn that even limited deliveries can slow the army’s collapse and signal Iran’s readiness to support Sunni-leaning partners. At a minimum, Sudan's military now has a new supplier, undermining U.S. and EU embargoes.

Red Sea Security: A New Front

Sudan’s shift toward Iran has significant implications for Red Sea security. Port Sudan, a deep-water hub on the African side of the Red Sea near the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, offers Iran strategic leverage. With Iranian influence in Sudan, Iran-aligned forces on the Sudanese coast could threaten vital shipping routes, including those to the Suez Canal. U.S. and Arab officials believe Iran views Sudan as a second front to challenge U.S. and allied navies in the Red Sea. Sudan’s proximity to Yemen would complement the Houthi presence and disrupt maritime routes in the Gulf of Aden.

Iran has signaled its intentions by emphasizing development projects in Sudan and suggesting that control of Port Sudan’s 700-kilometer coastline would enhance its ability to disrupt Red Sea trade. Even during Sudan’s period of isolation, Iranian vessels occasionally docked at Port Sudan. With SAF leadership based in Port Sudan, Iran’s new ally effectively controls a key African gateway to the Red Sea.

Western navies are already combating the Houthi threat from Yemen and must now monitor Sudan. The U.S. Navy’s recent strikes against Houthi positions aimed to secure Red Sea shipping, and some officials fear a second Iranian-aligned flotilla may emerge from Sudan. The shipping industry has already been rerouting around Africa to avoid missile and drone threats, and further instability from Sudan could cause delays or price increases.

Additionally, Sudan’s alignment with Iran could reopen arms channels to Gaza. Under Bashir, Sudanese ports and overland routes to Egypt were used to supply Palestinian militants. With current Sudanese leadership echoing Iran’s anti-Israel rhetoric, the possibility of Sudan resuming these operations is a growing concern for Israel, further tightening the anti-Israeli “arc” from the Gulf to the Horn of Africa and threatening Israeli shipping and borders.

The Gulf States: Friends Turned Foes

Burhan’s shift toward Tehran marks a significant reversal for Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both of which had heavily invested in Sudan since 2019. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi supported Sudan's transitional government and pressured Khartoum to sever ties with Iran. Sudan’s 2016 break with Tehran was largely a gesture of loyalty to the Gulf, which viewed Sudan as a strategic ally in Africa and the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia relied on Sudanese troops in Yemen, and the UAE secured a Red Sea port project. Both Gulf states saw Sudan’s normalization with Israel in 2020 as a success within the Abraham Accords framework.

Now, Saudi Arabia, long an ally of Burhan’s SAF, is alarmed by his new alignment with Tehran. The UAE, which invested billions in Sudan, is also concerned, particularly given its historical backing of Burhan’s rival, the RSF. Gulf analysts view the Sudanese war as a proxy conflict, with Saudi Arabia backing Burhan’s army and the UAE supporting Hemeti’s RSF. Burhan’s shift to Iran undermines Saudi influence and represents a strategic setback on the Red Sea. The UAE’s position is equally precarious. Its backing of the RSF through UAE-linked networks, including the Wagner Group, was aimed at countering Burhan. If Burhan now turns to Iran, the UAE’s investment in the RSF could be weakened, forcing a reassessment of its strategy. Both Gulf powers see control of Sudan’s resources and ports as critical, and Burhan’s Iranian alignment shifts the balance in favor of Saudi dissatisfaction.

The Gulf’s immediate response has been diplomatic caution. While the Gulf Cooperation Council has called for an end to the fighting, behind-the-scenes pressure is likely increasing. Saudi Arabia has already facilitated ceasefire talks and evacuated Sudanese refugees, making direct sanctions against Khartoum difficult. However, Saudi Arabia’s 2023 normalization with Iran may temper its response. The UAE is reportedly considering whether to increase support for the RSF to counter Burhan’s Iranian ties, with some experts urging sanctions against Iran’s involvement in Sudan. Ultimately, Burhan’s turn toward Iran represents a significant blow to Gulf influence, signaling a failed effort to secure Sudan’s allegiance and risking a diplomatic rift akin to the tensions seen during the Yemen conflict.

Israel and the Abraham Accords: A Fraying Ties

Until recently, Sudan was viewed as a potential partner in the Abraham Accords. In late 2020, under U.S. mediation, Sudan agreed to normalize relations with Israel in exchange for its removal from the U.S. terror list. The agreement was expected to bring Israeli investment, aid in technology, agriculture, and debt relief to Sudan. However, these prospects quickly faded. Relations with Israel remained minimal, and Sudan’s descent into civil war further undermined the partnership. Burhan’s pivot to Iran now negates even these limited ties. Israeli officials are reportedly concerned, with some warning that Sudan may once again become a hub for Iranian proxies.

Israel’s intelligence services are closely monitoring Sudan. Israeli reports highlight Israeli anxiety over Sudan’s growing ties with Iran. Initially, Burhan sought military assistance from Israel, but when Israel declined, he turned to Iran for support. This shift underscores how Sudan’s alignment with Israel has faltered. For Israel, an Iran-aligned Sudan presents a significant threat: it could be used to smuggle arms to Gaza or serve as a southern front against Israel. Iran’s long-standing goal of encircling Israel with hostile neighbors, through alliances with Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, would be completed with Sudan.

Israeli officials are also concerned about the broader regional implications. Following the Gaza conflict, Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping and their declared support for Hamas raised alarms. Sudanese ports may now complement these assets, enhancing Iran's ability to project power in the Red Sea, a strategic waterway historically contested by Israel and the U.S. For Israel, Burhan’s alliance with Iran represents an extension of Iran’s terror campaign into Africa. In response, Israel has increased maritime surveillance in the Red Sea, working with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and has urged Western navies to counter Iranian and Houthi threats. However, a formal Israeli response to Sudan is unlikely unless direct aggression occurs. Instead, Israel is strengthening intelligence and military ties with Gulf Arab states to monitor Iran's actions in Khartoum.

Sudan as a New Proxy Battleground

Sudan is increasingly being viewed as a theater for regional proxy competition, similar to Libya or Yemen. The war has already been framed as a Saudi–UAE proxy battle, with Saudi Arabia and Egypt backing Burhan, while the UAE, alongside Russia’s Wagner Group, supports Hemeti’s RSF. With Iran now involved, the conflict mirrors regional proxy wars.

In Yemen, Iran backs the Houthis, while a Saudi-led coalition supports Hadi’s government, with the UAE playing a distinct role. In Syria and Iraq, Iran supports Assad and allied militias, while U.S. and Gulf-backed opposition forces fight. Sudan could follow this pattern. If Burhan relies on Iran for arms, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, particularly the Quds Force, may cultivate local militias and intelligence networks within Burhan’s SAF, as it has in Syria and Iraq. The Kizan militia, for instance, could become a key pro-Iran faction.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE, already invested, may escalate their support: Riyadh could increase resources to the SAF, and Abu Dhabi may intensify backing for RSF-affiliated groups. Unconfirmed reports suggest Egypt might intervene directly in support of Burhan, adding another major player to the conflict. Analysts warn that prolonged foreign involvement could fragment Sudan, similar to Libya’s fragmentation, leading to multiple centers of power.

Moreover, Sudan’s civil war could ignite broader sectarian or ideological tensions. The RSF, with roots in Darfuri militias, has aligned with Russia and the UAE, while the SAF, dominated by former Islamist regime officers, shares ideological ties with Iran. As foreign actors deepen their involvement, clashes between SAF and RSF could intensify, with external backers fueling the conflict. International bodies, including Western and U.S. officials, have called for sanctions against foreign interference. The risk of Sudan becoming another Iraq or Syria, with international actors arming different factions, is now a serious concern.

Stakes for the United States and Western Allies

Khartoum’s shift toward Iran complicates Western policy. The U.S., which brokered Sudan’s normalization with Israel through the Abraham Accords and sought stability via multilateral talks, now faces a dilemma. While Washington condemns all foreign arms shipments to Sudan, with a State Department spokesperson warning that external involvement will only prolong the conflict, U.S. envoy Tom Perriello has emphasized Iranian influence in peace negotiations, aiming to counter Tehran's leverage by involving both Sudanese sides in talks.

However, the U.S. has been cautious about choosing sides in the conflict, sanctioning both Burhan and Hemedti. In early 2025, the Treasury Department sanctioned Burhan for leading forces accused of war crimes, followed by sanctions on Hemedti and UAE-linked arms networks funding the RSF. These actions demonstrate that U.S. policy targets all spoilers, without rewarding any side. Additionally, the same Treasury sanctions exposed Sudan’s secret drone deals, identifying a SAF procurement official involved in purchasing Iranian UAVs.

Beyond sanctions, Western concerns are strategic. The Sudan war has attracted Russian and Chinese involvement through Wagner Group and UN peacekeepers, and now Iran. If the conflict spreads into the Red Sea, threatening oil tanker routes, Europe and the U.S. face significant energy security risks. The Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping in late 2023 highlighted the vulnerability of maritime trade. The U.S. and Britain have already launched strikes on Houthi positions to keep the Suez route open, and a Sudanese front would exacerbate this challenge. Economically, a blockade of Sudan’s seaports would hinder humanitarian aid to East Africa, a priority for many Western countries.

Sudan has thus become both a humanitarian and geopolitical crisis for the U.S. Agencies are coordinating with IGAD and the UN to broker ceasefires and evacuations, as they did in Jeddah talks. However, Iran’s role complicates any negotiations. U.S. lawmakers have indicated that future negotiations with Iran, especially on nuclear or regional issues, will be difficult if Tehran continues to arm Sudan’s military. Some have explicitly called for accountability regarding Iran's meddling in Sudan.

European allies are also closely monitoring the situation. The EU has condemned the violence and warned of sanctions if Iran’s involvement increases. While the EU has limited leverage in Sudan, it shares U.S. concerns over disruptions to Red Sea trade. Britain, which co-led maritime security operations in the Red Sea, is particularly sensitive to the issue. In summary, the West faces a scenario it hoped to avoid: a destabilized Sudan slipping into Iran’s orbit, potentially undermining years of diplomatic efforts.

African Perspectives: AU, IGAD and Neighbors

African regional bodies have strongly condemned external interference in Sudan’s conflict. Shortly after the April 2023 outbreak of fighting, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council held emergency meetings, calling for an end to hostilities and a return to peaceful dialogue. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which includes Sudan, convened heads of state and urged all parties to cease fighting, emphasizing the risk of regional spillover into Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Chad. Neighboring countries, including Chad and Egypt, briefly closed their borders, fearing an influx of refugees and arms.

In February 2025, the AU convened top officials to address Sudan’s ongoing humanitarian crisis, urging coordinated intervention. Former AU envoys described the war as the “worst humanitarian crisis in the world” and called for inclusive dialogue. African leaders explicitly condemned foreign meddling, with the Pan-African Parliament president calling for an end to external influences exacerbating the conflict. Sudanese civil society also voiced frustration over Gulf and Iranian interference, accusing outsiders of prolonging the war.

Despite a historical distrust of Iran’s regime, many African states prioritize stability and conflict resolution over allegiances. Their focus is on pushing both Burhan and Hemeti to abandon violence and engage in political talks. Countries like Nigeria and Kenya, aligned with IGAD, have sent mediators to Khartoum, warning that any escalation could derail Sudan’s democratic aspirations. Although Iran’s involvement is an open secret, neither the AU nor IGAD supports it, both calling for an end to foreign intervention.

Iran’s involvement could complicate these efforts. Egypt, a longstanding supporter of Burhan, is wary of Iranian influence but has limited options for abandoning him. Ethiopia and Eritrea, both members of IGAD, have strong ties to the RSF, raising the risk of a sectarian proxy conflict if Iran intensifies its role. The AU’s statement highlights the concern: the war must not “affect us all.” African nations, even those with past tensions with Sudan, are united in opposing foreign interference. Sudan’s neighbors and African institutions are watching Iran closely, fearing the emergence of a Sudanese proxy war involving multiple regional powers.

Key Takeaways and Outlook

· Unexpected Realignment: Sudan’s military leader, Gen. al-Burhan, has shifted from Gulf allies to Iran, reversing Sudan’s 2016 break with Tehran. This shift reflects both the army's need for arms and Iran's desire for influence in Africa.

· Arms and Drones: Iran has begun supplying Burhan’s forces with combat drones, including Mohajer-6 and Ababil models, and likely other weapons. These supplies have had a tangible impact, with new drone strikes helping the SAF regain key positions in Khartoum by early 2024.

· Red Sea Chokehold: Sudan’s coastline provides Iran with a strategic foothold on the Red Sea. With Iranian-backed forces on both sides of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait (in Yemen and Sudan), maritime security is threatened, prompting global shipping companies to reroute vessels around Africa.

· Gulf Intrigue: Burhan’s pivot undermines Saudi and Emirati influence in Sudan. While Saudi Arabia supported Burhan, and the UAE backed his rival, the shift to Iran risks destabilizing the proxy balance, potentially drawing the Gulf states back into the conflict to protect their interests.

· Israeli Alarm: For Israel, an Iran-aligned Sudan is a significant setback. Sudan was expected to be an Abraham Accords partner but now risks becoming a conduit for Iranian or Houthi arms. Israeli officials have reportedly urged Arab allies and Washington to counter this shift.

· Wider Proxy War: Sudan’s conflict now mirrors other Middle Eastern proxy wars, with external powers like Iran, the UAE, and possibly Egypt backing opposing factions. African leaders call for an end to foreign interference, but the war is likely to continue attracting external involvement as Burhan and Hemeti vie for dominance.

· U.S. and Western Stakes: The U.S. and its allies are working to prevent the conflict from spreading. Washington has imposed sanctions on Burhan’s generals, coordinated with Gulf mediators, and pursued peace initiatives. However, further Iranian arms shipments could complicate these efforts and prompt a tougher U.S. stance on Iran, including on nuclear talks.

· Regional Stability: The African Union and IGAD have warned that Sudan’s war threatens regional stability, particularly in the Horn of Africa. They have called for a political solution and condemned foreign interference. If Iran’s involvement deepens, it may make peace even harder to achieve and exacerbate the humanitarian crisis.

Sudan’s tragedy has become entwined with broader geopolitical rivalries. Burhan’s alignment with Tehran may temporarily strengthen his army, but it risks alienating former allies and creating new adversaries. As Sudan becomes a pivotal piece in regional power struggles, the outcome will depend not only on military action but also on the broader contest between Iran and its rivals. For policymakers, the challenge is whether Sudan will remain a proxy battleground or if there is a path to restoring its sovereignty and resolving the conflict.

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